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The year was 1736, and two canoes quietly
paddled across the water of the Niagara
River illuminated only by moonlight.
The canoes’ pilots moved slowly and
silently and slipped beyond the gaze
of Fort Niagara which was perched on
a small outcropping on the east bank
overlooking the mouth of the river. The
canoes’ occupants – a French fur trader
by the name of Joseph LaFrance and eight
of his friends from the Iroquois tribe –
proceeded cautiously, wary of the penalties
they would face for their illegal smuggling
venture if detected by French authorities
in the fort. The commander would likely
have had them all thrown into chains and
confiscated their valuable bounty of furs
for the Crown’s profit. The group quietly
glided through the shadows – the striking
torch lit figure of Fort Niagara looming
over their backs – and into Lake Ontario,
deftly avoiding notice. They soon crossed
Niagara Falls and continued toward their
ultimate destination, the British Fort
at Oswego. There, Joseph LaFrance –
seeking a greater profit than trade with the
officials of his home country could offer
– waited in the forest near the fort while
his Iroquois companions negotiated with
British officials and merchants to secure
the profit LaFrance desired from his furs.
Once his furs had been sold, LaFrance and
his companions returned the way they had
come, making another long canoe trip to
LaFrance’s usual stomping grounds near
Fort Michilimackinac. Joseph LaFrance’s
story is not an unusual one. In fact,
in many ways, LaFrance embodies the
experience of a typical fur trader operating
in North America during the colonial
period. He professed no attachment or
loyalty to his country and undermined its
profits as he sought to multiply his own –
as so many others did.
British and French fur traders in the 17th
and 18th centuries navigated a complex
world dominated by imperial politics and
intercultural conflict accompanied by
near-constant danger. While frontier fur
traders generally sought profit before all
other considerations when trading with
Native Americans, the experiences of fur
traders associated with the British Empire
differed significantly from those aligned
with France. These differences resulted both
from the divergent objectives of British
and French colonialism in North America

and from the variety of cultural differences
amongst the tribes who traded with the
Europeans. Imperial officials aimed to
control the lucrative profits of the fur
trade through various forms of regulation,
which traders from both empires frequently
resisted with independent action. Further
examination reveals that the French
coureurs de bois and British traders exhibited
much greater agency in making important
decisions than one may expect. French
traders enjoyed significant autonomy at the
point of exchange; decisions they made on
the spot carried substantial ramifications
on the relationship between France and
the tribes trading with them as well as the
overall health of the trade. British traders –
whose trade was generally confined to posts
– ventured beyond British borders and set
up their own trading posts outside imperial
regulations. This paper examines how the
structural differences between the British
and French fur trades and the numerous
objectives of native villages coupled to
create an environment in which fur traders
could act as independent actors, though
they emerged in different forms.
Scholarship surrounding fur traders focuses
primarily on a macro-level analysis of
the frontiersmen and how they operated
within an imperially dominated exchange
network. Scholars tend to discuss fur
traders primarily within the context of
the European fur trade in North America,
presenting them as the furthest extensions
of imperial policy, and merely the cogs in
an imperial fur machine. This Euro-centric
perspective neglects much of the agency
that fur traders exhibited in their individual
interactions with Native Americans, which
often took place hundreds of miles from
the nearest official. This approach also
fails to discuss the significant effects that
the personal relationships and interactions
of individual fur traders had on their
countries relationship and policy toward
native peoples. While existing scholarship
provides valuable knowledge regarding
the overall health and functioning of the
fur trade from a variety of perspectives,
no work seems to be specifically dedicated
to presenting a fully comparative view of
fur traders in British and French North
America.
Most authors primarily deal with either
the British, French, or Native American
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perspective of the fur trade focusing their
greatest efforts on one or two over the
other(s). For example, Eric Jay Dolin’s
book Fur, Fortune, and Empire: The Epic
History of the Fur Trade in America provides
an excellent overview of the history of the
North American fur trade. While he does
touch on the actions and motivations of
individual tribes, his work is largely focused
on British and French perspectives.1 On
the other hand, Richard White’s book
The Middle Ground: Indians, Empires,
and Republics in the Great Lakes Region,
1650-1815 offers an in-depth discussion
of the intense cross-cultural dialogue
facilitated by the fur trade. However, his
work emphasizes primarily the perspectives
of tribes in the trade and does not direct
much effort toward discussion of the
traders’ agency.2 These two works are
representative of many approaches taken by
fur trade scholars.
Three major players dominated the North
American fur trade: a great number of
tribes – whose interests were not always
aligned but often similar – the British, and
the French. Though the degree to which
they became economically dependent
upon Europeans and their trade goods
continues to be a matter of debate, as
historian Daniel K. Richter noted, the
trade became “absolutely crucial” for
Native Americans seeking a number of
essential commodities.3 Longtime French
trader Pierre Gaultier de Varennes de
La Vérendrye noted that “powder, ball,
tobacco, axes, knives, chisels, and awls”
were among the most highly desired goods
by many tribes.4 In the early years of the
fur trade, then-scarce European goods
often carried a symbolic value rather than
a solely practical one and many societies
bestowed significant prestige and influence
upon their brethren who possessed and
subsequently traded away these goods.5
Thus, as Richard White asserts, rather than
imposing economic dependence on Native
Americans, European goods became “a
cultural necessity” long before they arose
as a material one.6 However, as these goods
became more common among the tribes
of North America and spread further west,
the crafting and hunting traditions that
these goods either made obsolete or much
easier gradually faded into distant memory
if they were not forgotten entirely.7
While many tribes did rely entirely on
direct trade with Europeans early on, this
dependence existed only in an economic
sense; most of these tribes remained
politically independent of New France and
the British colonies.
32
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Individual tribes exercised significant
autonomy and influence in the fur trade
dynamic and frequently played European
powers against each other in favor of their
own agenda. For example, the Assiniboine
and Cree tribes of Upper Canada enjoyed
a trade monopoly after the 1720s as the
middlemen of all trade coming into the
Hudson’s Bay Company post at Fort
Bourbon, as well as many of the numerous
French trading posts nearby. These tribes
enforced and expanded their grip on
this trade often through violence.8 They
exchanged furs gathered from tribes beyond
their own territory – such as the Mandan
and Blackfoot – as well as their own for
new manufactured goods with European
traders. The Assiniboine and Cree would
eventually return to the western tribes and
exchange their moderately used European
goods for a new batch of furs and repeating
the process regularly.9 Any group wishing
to make the long trek through their
territory to the post at Fort Bourbon – also
known as York Factory – had to be escorted
by members of the tribe.10
After obtaining furs, the Assiniboine and
Cree tribes could trade them with either
the French or the British. Though these
tribes were generally aligned with the
English, a significant number of these
middlemen chose to divert their trade to
nearby French traders.11 They could obtain
different kinds of goods from each partner
and in turn exchanged different types of
furs with each of them.12 Therefore the
Assiniboine and Cree exerted tremendous
influence as the central, pivotal powers
in this area of the fur trade.13 This level
of political – and often economic –
independence was not unique to these
tribes nor to tribes who traded with the
English. Most tribes engaged in the fur
trade wielded substantial autonomy and
influence as independent political and
economic actors in the dynamics of the
North American fur trade.
Most Native American groups involved
in the fur trade inextricably tied trade
and exchange of any kind directly to
personal relationships. One generally did
not exist without the other.14 Most tribes
insisted on establishing friendly relations
by performing ceremonies of friendship
and sharing food, drink, smoke, and
exchanging other gifts with traders before
the profitable trade could take place. This
approach to trade stood in stark contrast
to the European model of a business
transaction, namely the act of buying
and selling goods with strangers for some

arbitrarily valued currency.15 Moreover, the
goal of many tribes in trade – with both
Europeans and other tribes – was not to
garner the greatest profit possible from the
transaction but to ensure the satisfaction
of all parties involved.16 In many native
cultures involved in the fur trade, the
accumulation of individual wealth was
discouraged and very uncommon.17
Most Native Americans traded primarily
to clothe and decorate themselves with
European wool and trinkets, to acquire
highly useful metal tools, and to resupply
precious gunpowder and ammunition for
their next hunt.18
The friendships of native villages extended
only to individual traders and not
necessarily to the European empire they
hailed from. Most tribes in North America
were only loose collections of villages who
shared common culture, traditions, and
bloodlines. As such, most connections
with Europeans formed at a village level.19
Relationships between tribes and the
European powers were largely built and
maintained through the relationships of
fur traders and village leaders. Villages
often maintained independent relations
with different colonies and enabled
them to retain a degree of political
independence.20 One author compared fur
traders to “the rungs of a ladder” because
both “connected two parallel worlds and
kept them from crashing together in a
catastrophic collapse.”21 The fur trade could
not function in the same way – if at all –
without fur traders’ personal dealings. The
significance of their work granted them a
significant degree of autonomy and leverage
in dealing with imperial officials and village
leaders which was often exerted to carve a
greater profit for themselves.
The French and the British took vastly
different approaches in responding to the
trade customs of the tribes they traded
with. The French generally met their
trading partners on a cultural middle
ground.22 They embraced the interlocked
nature of trade and friendship with Native
Americans and often turned it to their
advantage. They traded with numerous
villages across the pays d’en haut, the Upper
Country – a term generally referring to
the area of French influence north of the
Ohio River Valley and into what is now
Canada – cultivating not only revenue,
but also alliances.23 Friendly relations with
several tribes – including the Algonquin,
the Huron-Petun, the Potawatomi, and
the Ojibwa, among many others – were
crucial to the very survival of New France

as a colony, as it ensured some degree of
stability and security within the fur trade.24
French officials often deemed the political
and military benefits of these alliances
more important than the actual revenue
generated by the trade fostering them.
France reaped its profit in the fur trade
from the sale of fermiers – monopolies
granted to companies of merchants on
the export of furs from New France. In
other words, the French crown would buy
their furs and only their furs.25 Thus the
health of the overall fur trade was most
important to French officials.26 As such,
French officials frequently sold goods at
a loss in order to force prices down to
levels that allied tribes would be more
satisfied with and to divert trade from the
English.27 France attempted to regulate the
number of traders in the Upper Country
by issuing licenses to individual traders
known as congés.28 While France could not
directly control these illegal traders, officials
could increase the number of congés in
circulation, pressuring the coureurs de bois
to conform to market prices and not to
exploit Native Americans in exchanges.29
These actions helped to improve the health
of the overall trade and happiness of French
trading partners.
France’s broader colonial interests explain
much of the nature of France’s fur trade
in North America. France never promoted
long-term settlement in New France,
and instead directed their efforts toward
the flourishing fur trade and converting
indigenous peoples to Christianity. Many
more fur traders inhabited New France
than traditional settlers: according to
a 1625 report, only twenty permanent
settlers lived in Quebec, and they were far
outnumbered by fur traders in the area.30
French historian Pierre de Charlevoix
journeyed to Quebec in 1720 tasked with
reporting back on the settlement’s state
to the Crown and stated that in terms of
infrastructure one “might reduce it to the
rank of our smallest cities in France” and
noted “no more than seven thousand souls
at Quebec.”31 He went on in one of his
many letters back to France to lament the
lack of people in New France suggesting
that the colony might be as successful and
profitable as any other in North America if
it were only sufficiently populated.32 France
had little interest in large-scale agricultural
development and rarely competed directly
with native villages for game or fish. If they
did, it was usually precisely focused and
done with the express permission of the
village who claimed the resource.33 France’s

focus on non-settlement activities meant
that their demand for tribal lands and
resources presented much less of a threat to
Native Americans.
Most fur traders working in the pay d’en
haut practiced the exchange technique
characteristic of those traders operating in
French territory known as en derouine.34
This term refers to fur traders embarking
on lengthy voyages from trade posts such
as Fort Michilimackinac, Fort La Reine,
and Montreal – where they purchased
or traded for European trade goods – to
villages deep in the Upper Country, where
they traded those goods for prized beaver,
bear, and mink furs, then returning to
the posts to trade and sell them.35 Fur
trader Joseph LaFrance, according to an
interview recorded by Sir Arthur Dobbs
and published in 1744, made such annual
round trips for a decade from his base at
Fort Michilimackinac to a friendly village
called Michipicoten just north of Lake
Superior.36 The near-constant, seasonal
movement required by trading en derouine
meant that fur traders were among the
most well-traveled people in America; some
estimates hold that Joseph LaFrance canoed
over 17,000 miles throughout the Upper
Country over the course of his career.37 En
derouine enabled traders to make the face
to face contact necessary to facilitate and
maintain long-term trading friendships
with villages.
Coureurs de bois often encountered
friendly villages willing to feed and house
them along their journey, and fur traders
frequently took this opportunity to foster
new trade and friendship. Upon reaching
a village, a trader was usually welcomed
as a friend and engaged in the traditional
friendship ceremonies before discussions
of trade began. For example, French trader
and explorer Nicolas Perrotfound found
a warm and celebratory reception among
the Miami and Mascouten of Green Bay.38
Sitting him on a buffalo skin, they offered
him the calumet, a traditional pipe of peace
and friendship, and food after which a
village leader carried him into the center of
the village on his shoulders. They housed
and feasted him for over a week, trading
and fortifying their new friendship.39 After
the ceremonies were complete, a trader
might then exchange what goods and furs
had already been gathered or arrange a
later time to meet and gather the season’s
fur bounty, acquainting themselves with
the surrounding lands and villages in the
meantime, as La Vérendrye did in 1737.40
The time fur traders spent living among

tribes provided the foundations of the
friendships that were so crucial to the fur
trade’s success.
The lives of fur traders were not all tales of
friendship and comfort. Traders journeying
into the pays d’en haut faced an impressive
variety of danger at every turn. As Joseph
LaFrance found out, the tumultuous waters
of Upper Country’s many rivers presented
the “utmost danger and difficulty in going
by water.”41 While their handmade birchbark canoes were quite maneuverable and
durable, the small crafts could not handle
the more ferocious waves. Rough waters
forced traders to disembark and carry
their goods, furs, and boats overland to
the next navigable point in the river. They
were forced to stop and hunt frequently,
as traders stuffed their meager cargo space
with as much fur and valuable goods as
they could.42 Fur traders also faced the
threat of attack from unfriendly tribes.
On his final trade venture to York Factory
in 1740, LaFrance traded and celebrated
with the Monsoni and Sturgeon tribes on
an island in the Lake of the Woods where
almost two dozen Frenchmen including La
Verendrye’s oldest son had recently been
slaughtered by a Sioux war party.43 The
fear of being violently raided and having
all their stock stolen was quite prevalent
among fur traders.44 If they were to survive,
fur traders had to forge their own means of
defense against this threat, either through
force or by strong friendships.45 Successful
fur traders realized the value of cultivating
close relationships with Native American
villages, and many attained positions of
leadership and respect among them.
Many coureurs de bois were well-respected
members of the native communities they
traded with and valued for their primary
connection to the European market.
Many came to lead tribes in a number
of ways. Some, like Joseph LaFrance,
did so in an economic sense. In 1743,
he led a large fleet of canoes from Cedar
Lake to the English post at York Factory,
bringing an estimated 50,000 beaver
furs and 9,000 martin skins.46 Some
traders also took leadership in a military
fashion. LaFrance led an attack against
the enemies of some friends he had made
at York Factory that failed miserably,
while French trader Charles-Michel de
Langlade led a substantial force of Ottawa
and Chippewa warriors against the British
post at Pickawillany and laid waste to the
town and its inhabitants.47 Some, like Peter
Chartier, even achieved political leadership.
Born to a Frenchman and his Shawnee
33
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wife, Chartier entered the fur trade with
the English. He built his influence among
his mother’s people and negotiated on their
behalf before turning on the British and
leading several attacks on British traders in
1745.48 However, Chartier did not take up
with the French. Instead, he stood for the
Shawnee in negotiations with the French
and resisted French orders to relocate the
tribe further north.49 Considering the
plentiful opportunities for autonomy,
authority, and profit available to a coureur
de bois Upper Country, it is no wonder
that they developed a strong sense of
independence from imperial authority
that prompted them to smuggle and divert
trade to the British.
The strict regulations and harsh
punishments that France attempted
to impose on illegal trade and traders
often served only to push their trade to
the English.50 This is likely what drove
LaFrance to help lead that massive fur fleet
– which included many of his own furs –
to the British post at York Factory, rather
than trading his furs with merchants at one
of the nearby French posts. In 1737, three
years before that trip, LaFrance canoed
to Montreal in hopes of acquiring a congé
and brought a large fur cargo for trade and
valuable gifts for the governor-general,
Charles de La Boische.51 The governor
accepted his gifts but threatened to arrest
and charge LaFrance with selling brandy
to Native Americans. LaFrance managed
to escape town but tried again a year later
and was captured, stripped of his cargo,
and his other belongings.52 Disenchanted
with his trading partners, LaFrance set out
on his journey to York Factory after a quick
escape. LaFrance was certainly not alone in
his disillusion with France’s bureaucracy;
two of the earliest and most famous French
traders, Pierre Esprit Radisson and Médard
Chouart des Grosseilliers, bristled against
French regulations. After risking their lives
to gather furs for the French in dangerous
Iroquois territory in the late 1650s, they
requested permission for another voyage.53
The governor overburdened them with
restrictions on this second venture, so
they set out on their own terms and were
arrested upon their return in 1663. The
governor imprisoned and fined them,
confiscating nearly all their furs. Upon
their release, they quickly turned to the
English and soon played foundational roles
in the establishment of the Hudson’s Bay
Company.54 Thus, France effectively created
its own greatest rival, which it continued
to support by pushing French traders away
with overly strict regulations.
34
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While France and the coureurs de bois
consistently made great efforts to meet
their Native American friends on a
cultural middle ground, the English hardly
made an effort. They only embraced the
connected nature of friendship and trade in
a superficial way and only so long as they
needed to. Instead of cultivating allies as
the French did, the British sought to create
subjects.55 The growing English colonies
soon had much more manpower than
New France, so British traders did not rely
upon friendships with native villages for
security as the coureurs de bois did.56 The
English primarily traded with the Iroquois,
Assiniboine, the Cree, the Shawnee, the
Miami, the Pequots, and several other
tribes across the Ohio River Valley and near
Hudson’s Bay.
These aggressive British attitudes are no
surprise when one considers their broader
colonial focus. In general, British colonial
policy aimed to create large, permanent
settlements and exploit the abundant
resources of North America.57 In the British
colonies, settlers far outnumbered other
residents such as fur traders. Farmers were
especially prevalent, as the crown heavily
promoted and rewarded the growth of
capitalist agriculture in the colonies.58 The
British colonies contained well over ten
times the population of New France at its
height, and these settlers typically “feared
and despised” Native Americans.59 The
animosity of English settlers largely resulted
from the tension between them and the
tribes who occupied the land they hoped
to inhabit. With such a large population
focusing their efforts toward acquiring land
where they could establish a farm and settle
their family, the English grated against
the nerves of many native groups and
presented a direct threat to their lands and
livelihoods.
The British colonies often competed in the
trade not just with the French, but with
each other as well. As most tribes formed
trade relationships at a village level, each
British colony established and maintained
its own independent fur trade.60 Thus, the
colonies in close proximity to each other
naturally competed for the same pool of
furs from local tribes. Such competition
sometimes turned violent as in 1634
between the Plymouth and Massachusetts
Bay Colonies. Fur trader John Hocking
sailed upriver from New Hampshire to
one of Plymouth Colony’s trading posts,
fiercely determined to cut off the cargo
being toted downriver by nearby tribes
and take it for himself. He blatantly

ignored warnings from the post’s leader,
John Howland, and continued upriver,
prompting Howland to gather a small
group and chase him down.61 They found
Hocking and his crew at anchor and began
to cut his mooring cables so he would drift
away. Hocking shot one of Howland’s men
in the head and was immediately killed
in retaliation.62 Hocking’s men retreated
and soon complained to the governor of
Massachusetts Bay Colony, John Winthrop.
The colony was outraged, and Winthrop
had a Plymouth magistrate – there entirely
by happenstance – seized and imprisoned,
holding him responsible for the events
near the post.63 Tensions between the
colonies ran high, but they soon arrived
at a peaceful solution. However, the event
sparked an expansion of the Massachusetts
Bay Colony’s fur trade in Maine, and they
soon strangled Plymouth Colony’s trade
out of existence.64 Competition over the fur
trade was ruthless even among countrymen.
While the coureurs de bois pushed further
into western territory, the British colonies
fortified trade closer to their borders.
British fur traders generally did not travel
to villages to generate trade. Instead, they
insisted that Native American traders
make the lengthy trek to trading posts and
towns established along the frontier beyond
the British colonies and near Hudson’s
Bay.65 From these outposts, fur traders
extended credit – in the form of trade
goods – to native traders and middlemen,
an investment expected to yield a profit
the following spring in the form of furs.
Traders often coerced Native Americans
into signing away their lands as collateral
in these exchanges.66 The actual point of
exchange between English traders and
Native Americans operated much the same
way as it did with the French; ceremonies
of friendship and gift-giving took place
before trade began.67
English traders also faced significant
danger in their work, as the trade posts
they operated in were always under
threat of attack. George Croghan, one
of Britain’s most prominent and prolific
traders, witnessed a trader murdered by
a seemingly friendly Huron-Petun after
an insultingly low trade offer; he offered
“but one charge of powder and one bullet
for a beaver skin to the Indian; the Indian
took up a hatchet and knocked him on the
head.”68 The stationary nature of English
trading posts made them convenient targets
for any retaliatory attacks directed at the
British in general. Frenchmen often took
up arms with the Shawnee and Delaware

against encroaching British trading posts
in the Ohio River Valley in the 1750s.69
However, being somewhat fortified and
often garrisoned, they were in a far better
position to defend themselves than the
French and their allies usually were.
Most tribes did not hold their English
trading friends in the same esteem as
they did their French counterparts. They
certainly harbored some bitterness at
the ever-encroaching waves of English
settlers forcing greater numbers of Native
Americans out of their homelands, but
this was also due in some part to the very
character of the average British fur trader.
As one historian noted, “most of these
traders were the very scum of the earth.”70
Many were notorious for being cheats and
crooks engaging in dubious trade tactics.
British Superintendent of Indian Affairs
William Johnson frequently complained
that these “men of lowest means”
manipulated weights when dealing with
Native Americans to secure a better profit,
casting a shadow on the reputation of all
British traders.71 Traders working for the
Hudson’s Bay Company frequently fiddled
with their report numbers to increase
their returns.72 While the French overall
enjoyed a very familial, friendly trade,
British traders were abrasive and often
pushed trade away with their greediness.73
Circumventing imperial trade regulations
and exploiting tribes in trade was one of a
few ways that English traders ignored their
national loyalties.
The variations in the structures of the
French and British fur trades led to
different forms of independent resistance
to regulation. While the coureurs de bois
enjoyed enough autonomy to divert their
furs to whichever merchants offered them
the best price, British traders operated
under more direct supervision at trading
posts. Some of them went to extreme
measures to secure their own profit,
like Thomas Morton. Born in England,
Morton arrived in North America in
1625, accompanying a venture intent on
establishing a fur-trading operation on the
Massachusetts Bay. After a harsh winter the
captain, Wollaston, fled to the warmth of
Virginia, leaving Morton behind to oversee
the small outpost they had set up.74 Morton
had become enamored with New England,
once remarking on its unparalleled beauty,
calling it “Nature’s Masterpiece.” Smitten,
Morton refused Wollaston’s orders to send
more of his servants south. Instead, Morton
coerced many of them to stay behind and
join his new venture. Morton established

his own trading post on a nearby hill,
eventually known as Merrymount.
Merrymount was a post governed by few
rules, and its members determined to enjoy
life and reap a profit. Morton maintained
close friendships with nearby villages and
was reportedly enthralled by their way
of life. He respected his native allies as
“friends and co-conspirators,” a sentiment
uncommon among British traders. 75

traders parallel those of the coureurs de bois
practicing en derouine in a striking way. This
suggests that the level of official supervision
allowed for by the French trade system was
a key factor in coureurs de bois being so
independent.

Merrymount traders primarily exchanged
guns with local Massachusett and
Narragansett peoples for beaver pelts. Trade
thrived and Morton’s profits soared.76 The
nearby Plymouth Colony found themselves
disturbed by the “great licentiousness” of
Morton’s crew and their antics, and the
trade flowing through his post directly
competed with their own, which was a vital
source of income for the colony.77 Even
more egregious was Morton’s willingness to
fraternize and trade in firearms with Native
Americans, an act prohibited by English
law.78 Colonial officials issued a declaration
to Morton in the spring of 1628, and
warned him to cease his trade activities
immediately, citing his violation of the
King’s law. Morton defiantly replied that
“the king was dead and his displeasure,”
blatantly declaring his distaste for imperial
control.79 Later that year, colonial officials
organized a small expedition to force
Morton from Merrymount and destroy
the trade there. They soon deported him
back to England after a trial.80 Morton
had arrived in North America in England’s
employ, exploited the imperial system to
attain significant autonomy and profit, but
returned to England as a prisoner.

A comparison of European trade systems
reveals that the English enjoyed several
advantages, but they also suffered from
some crucial weaknesses inherent in their
system. As mentioned above, the English
manufactured higher quality goods than the
French and could offer them at much better
prices.84 They also offered much better prices
for furs; two independent reports found that
the English paid around two to four times as
much as the French for fur.85 The restriction
of trade to posts also allowed a great degree
of imperial supervision over the course of
trade, which gave England more control over
exchange rates and profit margins. However,
English insistence on making native traders
journey long distances to British trade
posts undoubtedly cost them a significant
amount of trade, as distant tribes such as the
Mountain and Blood tribes risked starvation
with every trip to York Factory.86 If they
could not take their trade to the French, they
were forced to trade through middlemen
like the Iroquois, the Assiniboine, and the
Cree, usually under worse terms. This, in
turn, constrained the English fur supply to
only the middlemen groups and those who
sneak by them, giving the natives significant
leverage while negotiating with them. The
French did not have this issue, as the farreaching coureurs de bois continually sought
out new and diverse sources of furs spread
across the Upper Country.

In lieu of popular practice, some British
traders did venture out to villages to generate
trade. Two trade voyages by Hudson’s Bay
Company employees Smith and Waggoner
and William Pink offer details on such
trips. Escorted by groups of friendly Cree
natives on journeys from York Factory a
decade apart, they hunted and trapped
with their guides through autumn and
winter, returning by canoe with a hefty load
of furs in the spring.81 These experiences
were not typical of English traders largely
because wealthy merchants in Albany –
whose goods were sold at trade posts across
the colonies – heavily discouraged traders
from venturing out to native villages, as
they made far more money by containing
trade to posts.82 British settlement efforts
were also largely subordinated to trade
development around the Hudson’s Bay area,
meaning official supervision of the trade was
also less prevalent.83 The experiences of these

The most significant difference between the
French and British systems is the degree
to which they allowed for official imperial
supervision of the actual trade. As the
coureurs de bois penetrated further west,
they removed themselves further from the
watchful French authorities. Since most of
their trade occurred in native villages, no
officials were present to ensure the terms
favored New France nor to ensure that
the furs made it back to French merchants
and brought profit to the crown. The
English system kept trade tightly restricted
to trade posts where it could be observed,
recorded, and any credit involved could be
guaranteed. Consequently, imperial officials
could directly oversee rates of exchange,
interest, and lending practices. In addition,
the fur bounty never had to be entrusted to
unsupervised traders and could be shipped
directly to Britain upon acquisition from
Native Americans. Therefore, the vast
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distances that characterized the French
trade were directly responsible for the
significant autonomy afforded to coureurs de
bois, enabling them to become “nationless”
actors more frequently than British traders.
In many ways, this relatively small group
of men navigated a complex world of
intercultural trade and imperial rivalry and
wielded enormous influence over EuroNative American relations and commerce.
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